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ROMAN INGARDEN: ONTOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS FOR LITERARY THEORY 
 
Barry Smith 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The Polish phenomenologist Roman Ingarden (1893-1970), 
follower and student of the early Husserl, was probably the 
most significant of all those philosophers who came within 
Husserl′s sphere of Influence. He lived a long and productive 
life, despite economic and political difficulties, and he 
made contributions to many areas of philosophy. Yet he has 
acquired a reputation--until now--within one field only, 
that of aesthetics.1 This is to some extent surprising since 
from the very start Ingarden himself conceived his aesthetic 
writings as part of a much larger, ontological project, that 
of providing the materials which would make possible the 
solution of what to him appeared to be the most important 
__________ 
1Ingarden′s first major work was in this field: The Literary Work of Art: 
Investigations on the Borderlines of Ontology, Logic and the Theory of 
Literature original German edition, (Halle, 1931); English translation 
by George C. Grabowicz (Evanston, 1973). This was followed by The 
Cognition of the Literary Work of Art, original Polish edition (Lwów,
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problem in philosophy, the so-called ″idealism - realism″ 
problem: der Streit um die Existenz der Welt, in a massive 
work (l500pp.) bearing this title Ingarden went a long way 
toward providing such materials, and it is one of the 
scandals of present-day philosophy that this work is so 
little known.2 
 
This is from one point of view understandable: the 
realism - idealism problem was, it is true, vital to philos- 
ophy in the early 1900′s. (The realist works of Brentano, 
Meinong, Moore and Russell, for example, can all be seen as 
reactions to various forms of Hegelian idealism). But it is 
a problem which is no longer to be found amongst the central 
concerns of philosophy. Yet Ingarden′s work on this high 
ontological plain is not thereby without significance for 
present-day philosophers, nor, indeed, for literary 
theorists who may look to philosophy in the hope of finding 
ontological foundations for their discipline. For Ingar-
den′s Streit book has, I want to suggest, a significance 
__________ 
1937) English translation by Ruth A. Crowley and Kenneth B. Olson 
(Evanston, 1973); and then by Investigations in the Ontology of Art: 
Music, Painting, Architecture, Film, original German edition (Tübingen, 
1962) English translation (Evanston, forthcoming). 
2The work was, for political reasons, originally published in Polish: 
Spór o istnienie świata (Kraków 1947-48), 2 vols., partial English 
translation of vol. I as Time and modes of Being (Springfield, 1964). 
Expanded German version: Der Streit um die Existenz der Welt, vol. I, 
Existentialontologie (Tübingen, 1964); vol. II, Formalontologie, 
part 1, Form und Wesen, part 2, Welt und Bewuβtsein, both Tübingen, 
1965, vol. 3, Über die kausale Struktur der realen Welt (Tübingen, 1974). 
Cf. the discussion of parts of vol. II, 1 in my ″An Essay in Formal 
Ontology″, Grazer Philosophische Studien, IV (1978). 
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which resides elsewhere than its author had supposed: it 
is the by-product of Ingarden′s larger ontological investi- 
gations which promise to yield their true value for present- 
day thinkers. 
 
Indeed the book contains a huge mass of individual 
ontological insights systematically developed and applied 
to specific areas (for example, causality, theory of 
language, philosophy of mind, clarification of specific 
ontological issues in the tradition of philosophy . . .)-- 
always for the sake of Ingarden′s larger goal, that of 
justifying in a critical manner his realist opposition to 
those, such as Husserl, who argued in favour of some form 
of idealist conception of the world and of the foundations 
of consciousness.3 
 
Now one further field in which this system of onto- 
logical insights can profitably be applied is, of course, 
that of literary theory, the area where Ingarden himself 
carried out his most detailed investigations in ″applied 
ontology″. But we must not be overoptimistic in regard to 
the results of such application. It is difficult to see, 
for example, how problems of value theory can be solved by 
direct application of the kind of descriptive ontological 
method practised by Ingarden. The most we can hope for-- 
in the beginning--is that we should come to a clearer con- 
ception of the locus of aesthetic value, that is, of what 
__________ 
3Ingarden characterised the idealist position as one according to which 
the real world was conceived too closely after the fashion of fictional 
worlds projected by works of literature; hence the onto1ogical character 
of his investigations of the literary work of art, which Ingarden hoped 
would reveal the untenability of any narrowing of the gap between real 
objects and products of consciousness. 
 
375 
 
 
 
LANGUAGE, LITERATURE AND MEANING 
 
kind of thing it is to which aesthetic value can properly 
be ascribed. 
 
At first it might be supposed that there is a simple 
answer to this question: that it is the ″work of art″ which 
has aesthetic value. But as yet this tells us nothing of the 
intrinsic nature, the ontological structure of the ″work of 
art″. As can be seen by reflection upon the case of, say, 
the dramatic work, this structure may be tremendously 
complex, for in our determination of its constituents we 
must find a way of taking account of all those features 
which may contribute to the status of the work as an 
aesthetically formed whole, take account, that is, of all 
that may be phenomenologically given in the various different 
kinds of appreciation of the work, not only by the spectator 
in relation to the concrete visual and aural material of 
a given performance and by the actors performing the work 
in relation to this visual and aural material and to the 
script, but also by subjects outside any context of perform- 
ance who accede to the work as an abstract whole, either in 
a temporally extended way (in some kind of mental ′perfor- 
mance′, or ′reading′ of the script), or in such a way that 
the work is treated as an unextended unity, for example 
within contexts where it is merely referred to in passing. 
 
Yet however complex nay be the structure of works of 
art of each of the various different species, it is crucial 
to the whole of aesthetics that the appropriate ontological 
analyses of this structure be carried through. For only when 
we know what kind of thing the work of art is can we deter- 
mine the various axes along which it may acquire aesthetic 
value, be compared with other works, etc. Only then, that 
is to say, would we be in a position to tackle the central 
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Value-theoretical problems of aesthetics itself. 
 
2. The Ontology of Fiction 
 
In the present essay I want to sketch one plank of 
such an ontological foundation for literary theory, using 
the problems which arise as a means of introducing the 
Ingardenian mode of argument to the practising literary 
theorist. A literary work conceived as an organised whole 
has various constituents, e.g. the characters of the work, 
the individual word-meanings, sentence-rhythms, plot- 
segments, historical allusions, and so on. Clearly there 
is no question that these ′constituents′ be conceived after 
the pattern of matches in a box (side by side with each 
other). They exhibit, rather, a whole series of inter- 
relations and mutual dependencies. It is Ingarden′s service 
to have unravelled this texture of interrelationships, to 
have shown that in order to make clear the structure of the 
literary work it is necessary to conceive it as a 
″stratified″ whole, constituents of one particular stratum 
acting together to ″found″ constituents of ″higher″ strata 
when the text of the work is ″concretised″ in our acts of 
reading.4 
__________ 
4The technical terms introduced in the text are all of them drawn from 
Ingarden′s The Literary Work of Art. Note how, given the stratified 
conception of the literary work, Ingarden can then begin to determine 
in an extremely precise way the types of aesthetic quality which such 
a work may possess. For he will argue that particular sets of value- 
qualities can be associated, in a systematic way, first of all with the 
constituents of each particular stratum: of sound-material, meaning-
unities, represented objects, aspects, metaphysical qualities, etc., 
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Ingarden′s account of the various strata of the literary 
work, and the resultant conception of the work as a two- 
dimensional formation, have received adequate treatment in 
the literature.5 Here, therefore, I want to consider in more 
detail than hitherto one particular subsidiary problem in 
the ontology of literature, the problem of the nature of 
individual fictional characters. Some schools of philosophers 
would wish to dismiss this very formulation of a ″problem″ 
as itself misleading from the start. Such philosophers would 
assert that there are no such things as fictional characters 
__________ 
reflecting the fact that different ranges of value criteria are applied 
by the critic in his estimations of the work according to whether he 
is concerning himself with, say, the poetic qualities of individual 
sentences, or with the subtleties of the plot, or with the delineations 
of the characters, and so on. But then secondly the critic may concern 
himself with the interrelations between constituents of the various 
different strata. And this is reflected in Ingarden′s theory by the 
fact that va1ue-qualities are associated with the different types of 
interrelationships which exist between the various strata. Ingarden 
speaks, indeed, of a polyphony of the literary work, quite deliberately 
suggesting a parallel to the case of musical polyphony, where our 
appreciation of the subtlety of the interrelations of the various 
different voices plays a role in our evaluation of the work which is 
no less important than our estimation of the themes and variations 
articulated by these individual voices taken separately. 
5Cf. the various standard philosophical reference-books, as well as the 
English translation of The Literary Work of Art (summarised in my 
review in Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, VI (1975), 
111-114 and also, from a different point of view, in the paper referred 
to in note 11 below.) Ingarden′s stratificational analysis lies at the 
root of the central, ontological chapter of Warren and Wellek′s 
Theory of Literature (Penguin Books; originally published 1949)--but 
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rather only, say, the concrete printed material of 
particular texts and the sequences of mental events 
associated with the readings of such texts (themselves 
regarded as somehow intrinsically private). But it seems 
clear that once who would maintain such a reductivist 
position is incapable of providing an acceptable foundation 
for the theory of literature, i.e. one which could satisfy 
the criteria of adequacy to all that is phenomenologically 
given in our commune with works of literature. For whilst 
fictional characters clearly have no kind of real, concrete 
existence, even the most cursory glance through works of 
literary criticism or literary history will show that there 
are certain kinds of deliberative, critical concern with 
literary works within which a central role is played by 
fictional characters as such. Indeed there is no way in 
which we can achieve a faithful reading of a fictional work 
without presupposing from the start that it is correlated 
with its own specific field of fictional characters. We can 
gain some idea of the nature of this ″field of characters″ 
if we spend some time reflecting upon the notion of ″access″ 
--a notion which has always stood at the very centre of 
phenomenological ontology. 
 
3. Ontological and Epistemological Incompleteness 
 
We have access to those flesh-and-blood human beings 
who are our contemporaries through physical contact of 
various kinds (shaking hands, etc.). We have progressively 
weaker access to no longer existing human beings through 
__________ 
cf. Ingarden′s criticisms reproduced on pp. 1xxviii to 1xxxiii of 
Grabowicz′s translation. 
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memories, newspaper reports, historical remains, etc., and 
it seems clear that this kind of ″documentary″ access is a 
well-founded extension of the more primitive physical modes 
of access. I want to argue that one of the underlying 
justifications for the conception of fictional characters 
as individual objects forming a well-demarcated ″field″ 
associated with each particular novel is a further, analo- 
gous extension of this notion of access, extended beyond 
historical documents, now, to include also literary works. 
 
The analogy involved here should not, however, mislead 
us into supposing that there is any similarity in ontolo- 
gical structure between the two kinds of object (real and 
fictional). Perhaps the most radical dissimilarity turns 
on a quite peculiar ontological incompleteness which is 
enjoyed by fictional objects. This notion may be explained 
as follows: In the case of historical figures it is true 
that our knowledge is always incomplete, owing to the fact 
that it rests on only a finite quantity of information,6 
where the objects of our knowledge, like all temporally 
existing things, have (more correctly: had, when they 
existed) an infinite number of ever-changing concrete 
properties. Nevertheless the incompleteness invo1ved here 
is purely epistemological: if we know only that Henry Nth 
lost an arm in the Battle of X, but not which arm, then we 
do not suppose that after the battle Henry himself was 
ontologically structured in such a way that the missing 
arm was indeterminately neither right nor left. With 
__________ 
6Problems arise owing to the fact that in particular cases some or all 
of this information may be false; this may even lead, on the epistemolo-
gical side, to the existence of conflicting properties in the stock of 
all that we know about a given object. 
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fictional characters however we have to come to terms in 
our theory with just this kind of intrinsic incompleteness 
(an incompleteness suffered by the characters themselves, 
independently of any additional epistemological incom- 
pleteness which may arise due to inadequacies in particular 
readings of the appropriate works). 
 
Real objects cannot be ontologically incomplete in this 
sense, for although every act of perception of such objects 
is partia1 and one-sided, there exists (or, in the case of 
real objects in the past, did exist) the constant possib- 
ility of further, complementary perceptions (Husserl talks 
of ′turning the apple in one′s hand . . . ′), such that 
there is in principle no point where indeterminacies in the 
object may lay undetected.7 Fictional objects on the other 
hand are such that from the very start we can exclude the 
possibility of supplementary information, information which 
would be additional to that which is to be found in (or, 
within certain limits, read into) the texts themselves. 
Note however that this problem of ontological incompleteness 
is something which raises its head exclusively on the 
theoretical level: we are never aware of the intrinsic in-
completeness of fictional characters in our actual readings 
of works. This is because the possibility of a complete per- 
ception or complete knowledge is excluded also in the case 
of real objects, owing to the ever-present epistemological 
incompleteness involved in our access to such objects. Thus 
we can do no other, in our pre-theoretical commune with real 
objects and with the quasi-real objects of fiction, than 
ascribe all inadequacies in our knowledge to the side of 
__________ 
7This situation may fail to hold on the level of quantum physics. 
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epistemological incompleteness: this explains why our mode 
of reading works of fiction is--from this point of view-- 
almost identical with our mode of reading not only histori- 
cal works but also e.g. newspaper reports concerning our 
contemporaries. In no case do we find it possible, in our 
reading, to draw a line between indeterminacies which are 
merely epistemological and indeterminacies which may be 
contributed by the objects themselves. 
 
4. The Double Structure of the Objects of Fiction 
 
Parallels of this nature between our mode of access to 
real and fictional objects respectively should not be allowed 
to mask the radical heterogeneity of the two types of object 
from the ontological point of view. However complex may be 
the interrelations between the various properties possessed 
by a real object (say between the perceptual, biological, 
chemical and physical qualities of a given apple), there 
remains an intrinsic unity amongst these properties, in 
consequence of the fact that these interrelations exist, 
that the properties in question are bound up together within 
the structure of the object itself. For the case of fictional 
objects however, Ingarden argues that we have to deal with 
a quite peculiar kind of ′double structure′ in the fabric of 
properties possessed by these objects. That is, where the 
real object possesses a single rank of properties all of 
which are bound together within the object itself, the 
fictional object possesses two ranks of properties with no 
non-arbitrary relationships existing across the ′barrier′ 
between them. This ′double structure′ is reflected in the 
fact that we encounter two quite different sets of statements 
about fictional characters, with two quite different kinds 
of truth-behaviour. Statements of the first kind (A) might 
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be, e.g.: 
(1)  Sherlock Holmes was presented by Conan Doyle in work W 
as a detective who lived in Baker Street, played the 
violin . . . . 
(2)  Dr. Watson is a less adequately developed character 
than Holmes. 
(3)  Raskolnikov did not exist as a flesh-and-blood human 
being; ′his′ status is exclusively that of an ontological 
correlate of particular networks of conscious acts on 
the part of certain appropriately qualified subjects. 
(4)  (Shakespeare′s) Hamlet is a fictional character. 
And of the second kind (B): 
(5)  Sherlock Holmes was a detective who lived in Baker 
Street, played the violin . . . . 
(6)  Dr. Watson is a more likeable character than, has a 
warmer personality than Holmes. 
(7)  The Blagdon rapist imitated Raskolnikov. 
(8)  I know more about Hamlet than I do about Hannibal. 
Now our account of the structure of fictional objects must 
reflect (i) the fact that A-statements may be true, uncon- 
ditionally, and that such statements satisfy the law of 
excluded middle;8 and (ii) that we can acknowledge B-state- 
__________ 
8The law of excluded middle states that for any given sentence either 
it or its negation is true. In particular if ′S′ is the name of an 
object, then for any predicate expression ′p′ (′is red′, ′is taller 
than 3 feet′, and so on), one or other of the two sentences, ′S is p′, 
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ments as (in some way) ′correct′ or ′incorrect′ only if we 
interpret the predicates involved more or less metaphorical- 
ly: Sherlock Holmes was not, after all, a detective in the 
strict sense of this term--since only flesh-and-blood human 
beings may qualify for the status of detectivehood. We must 
also note that B-statements fail to satisfy the law of 
excluded middle, in the sense that there are many incorrect 
B-statements which are such that their negations, too, are 
incorrect. (Consider, e.g., the statement-pair: ′Hamlet was 
left-handed′, ′Hamlet was not left-handed′.) 
 
This means that whilst we may associate with each true 
A-statement concerning a given fictional object some deter- 
mination within the object itself, B-statements must be 
dealt with in a quite different way. Ingarden′s suggestion 
is, then, that we develop a conception of fictional objects 
as radically distinct, in their property behaviour, from 
real objects of the material world. Fictional objects are 
to be conceived, namely, as possessing two quite distinct 
ranks of properties, one rank corresponding to true A-state- 
ments about a given object, and a second rank--of properties 
which are merely ascribed--corresponding to correct B-state- 
ments, i.e., in effect, to the sentences of the appropriate 
novel. Any resultant incompatibility is made harmless by the 
fact that members of each group are acceded to within two 
quite distinct contexts, for it is only on the level of 
theory that we accede to rank A properties, where it is 
exclusively rank B properties which hold our attention 
during any actual reading of the work. Only within certain 
__________ 
′S is not p′, is true. Thus failure of the Law of excluded middle for 
names of objects of a given type correspond to ontological incom- 
pleteness of those objects. 
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quite peculiar ontological contexts does our commune with 
fictional objects suffer a certain ″bifocal″ character (as, 
for example, within the context established by the present 
essay). But then again, of course, that there are such con- 
texts can itself be accounted for only if we accept some 
kind of double-rank ontology along the lines suggested by 
Ingarden. 
 
5. Ontological and Epistemological Nodality: the Nature of 
the Objects of Fiction 
 
We might summarise our results thus far concerning the 
ontological structure of fictional characters by saying 
that such characters are individual objects possessing two 
ranks of properties, members of the first rank being all, 
as inspection reveals, ″non-material properties″ (being 
either formal or ″purely intentional″), members of the second 
rank consisting of those properties which seem to be assigned 
to the given characters by the sentences of the appropriate 
works.9 In the final section of this paper I shall attempt 
to clarify this peculiar structure and at the same time to 
show how the problems which it reveals are relevant to the 
practical concerns of the literary theorist, by going beyond 
the Ingardenian ontological mode of investigation and 
calling into aid certain considerations relating to the 
″act phenomenology″ of our reading of literary works.10 
__________ 
9Here we include also all those properties which are, within certain 
limits, deducible from the properties assigned by the given sentences. 
Cf. the discussion in J. Wood, The Logic of Fiction (Paris and the 
Hague 1974), § 13. 
1OThe group of analyses which pertain to act phenomenology of the kind 
which is illustrated in the text are drawn not only from Ingarden′s 
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Let us recall, first of all, the notions of epistemo- 
logical and ontological incompleteness introduced in 3 above. 
For the sake of the present argument we may risk talking in 
terms of two ″spheres″, an epistemological and an ontological 
sphere, and it will be clear, I hope, that the degrees of 
completeness on either side of the boundary between the two 
spheres may vary, more or less independently of each other. 
Thus we can encounter, on the one hand, cases of epistemo- 
logically incomplete access to ontologically complete 
objects--this is true, indeed, of every perception of a 
real object. And we can encounter also, on the other hand, 
cases of access to objects where the degree of epistemo- 
logical completeness is greater than is warranted by inde- 
terminacy intrinsic to the object in question. This arises, 
e.g., when in reading a work of fiction we import from our 
own experience aspects which are additional to those held 
in readiness within the work itself. (As when I identify 
myself with the hero of a work of detective fiction, and 
ascribe to him qualities which I possess). Further the axes 
of epistemological and ontological completeness may lie 
wholly skew to each other. This occurs when the ″matter″ 
with which I epistemologically ″complete″ an object is alien 
to the material—ontological constitution of that object 
itself (when I mistake a sand-dune for an oasis, or a Van 
Meegeren for a Vermeer). 
 
What is important is that it is not only in regard to 
the notion of relative completeness - incompleteness that 
we encounter this kind of two-sided independence of variation 
__________ 
works but also from those of his mentor, Edmund Husserl, in particular 
from the latter′s Ideas (originally published, 1913). 
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(i.e. among acts and their objects). An act may be temporal-
ly extended even though its object be temporally punctual 
(as when I reflect for some time on a particular instanta- 
neous event). And it is possible also to relate to temporal- 
ly extended objects in temporally instantaneous acts, (e.g. 
in acts of passing reference to performances of musical 
works). And again, an act and its object may be ″skew″ in 
regard to their temporal extendedness: I may re-live, in 
memory, a particular performance of a musical work, suc- 
ceeding only partially in re-creating the original temporal 
relations introduced by the conductor, introducing gaps of 
my own, etc. An act may have a more or less discursive 
character (acts of assertion, of argument, of deduction . . 
. ), and so too may the ontological correlate of an act 
(e.g. of an act of reference to a proposition, a syllogism, 
a theorem . . .). Yet clearly we may have a wholly non- 
discursive act (an act of pure reference) whose ontological 
correlate is itself discursive, just as we may have highly 
complex discursive acts involving reference to entities 
which are in themselves non-discursive. 
 
An act may be such as to be perceptually fulfilled, 
just as the object of an act may possess its own ontological 
″fulfilling qualities″--those of its determinations which 
give rise to corresponding perceptual fulfilment In appro- 
priately directed acts. All perceptual objects are ontolo- 
gically ″full″ in the sense here delineated, and clearly 
it is possible that an act of reference to such an ontolo- 
gically ″full″ object should itself be epistemologically 
″empty″. (As when I refer to the no-longer-perceivable 
perceptual object Julius Caesar). But so too it is possible 
that an act should be characterised by an imported perceptual 
fulfilment which is alien to the object of the act. This 
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is the case, e.g., in those acts which may--rightly or 
wrongly--accompany our acts of reading works of fiction, 
acts which project more or less sensually ″filled″ images 
of the characters involved. 
 
And here at last we are beginning to see how these 
considerations may throw light on the nature of our acts 
of reading works of fiction and on the ontological correlates 
of such acts, including fictional characters. We have seen 
that our acts on one side and their objects on the other are 
characterised by various different kinds of epistemological, 
respectively ontological variation possibilities. And what 
I wish to claim is that it is the existence of coherent, 
determinately structured manipulations of such variation- 
possibilities which makes possible our access to non-real 
objects of all kinds, not only to the objects of fiction but 
also--where appeal is made to a quite different selection of 
axes of variation--to the objects of the various natural 
sciences, of mathematics, etc.11 
 
In the case of acts of reading fiction we make a con- 
tinuous appeal to the possibility of epistemological ful- 
filments of specific kinds which are not rooted in ontolo- 
gical filling qualities in the objects themselves. Thus 
whilst the objects of fiction are clearly not themselves 
perceptual objects, our acts of attention to such objects 
yet involve treating them as if they were perceptually 
filled, even though the filling qualities which we introduce 
__________ 
11For a discussion of the mathematical work as a borderline case of the 
literary work of art see my paper ″The 0ntogenesis of Mathematical 
Objects″, Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, VI (1975), 
91-101. 
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are--in the case of adequate readings--determinately 
″neutralised″, (i.e. do not involve any sensual filling 
out on our part, by means of actual images of the objects 
involved). Similarly when we move from the level of per- 
ceptual features to the level of events and actions depicted 
in the novel: ontologically speaking fictional characters 
are not involved in any actually existing plot. Fictional 
characters can in no way become embroiled in actual murders, 
suffer from fear, make decisions, engage in conversations. 
Yet in our readings of works we ″fill out″ the objects 
depicted by conceiving them as involved precisely in actions 
and events of this sort. Indeed because our only access- 
route to such objects lies through the understanding of a 
determinately structured set of sentences involving action 
and event-verbs of determinate types, it follows that we 
cannot accede to fictional objects in a fulfilled way at all 
except as bound up with corresponding actions and events. 
Yet this epistemological filling out on the level of plot 
is again something which is ″neutralised″, ″suppressed″--at 
least in adequate readings of a work: aesthetically adequate 
readings involve a certain detachment of our own personal 
interest from the fate of the characters depicted. 
 
In fact similar epistemological fillings out--each 
determinately neutralised or suppressed--pertain to every 
level of the work. In each case we have to deal with objects 
which are in themselves in a certain sense ′nodai′, i.e. 
purely non-extended: they serve as mere co-ordinate points 
of our attention in our acts of reading works of fiction. 
Yet they are at the same time objects which bring-forth in 
determinate ways epistemological fillings out, in consequence 
of the fact that it is only be making an adequate concre- 
tisation of relevant sequences of sentences that we can gain 
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access to those objects at all. Just as the access-route 
to perceptual objects, through an array of perceptual ex- 
periences of certain kinds, determines the nature of our 
epistemological model of such objects, so the access-route 
to fictional objects through an array of sentences of 
particular types determinates the nature of the model which 
we bring to bear in our re-creation of such objects in 
particular readings. 
 
It is the task of the literary theorist to clarify the 
consequences of this dependence of fictional objects upon 
determinate types of readings of particular sequences of 
sentences. In particular he must find a way of determining 
the axes along which epistemological fillings out of the 
various different kinds may take place in such a way as to 
remain faithful to the work and then, eventually, to yield 
a reading which is adequate to bring to light the aesthetic 
qualities of the work on each of its various different 
levels. I hope that I have shown that both ontological arid 
phenomenological analyses--of the type so well demonstrated 
by Ingarden--may be of help to the literary theorist in his 
execution of these tasks. 
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